Crunch Time: Analyzing Texas’ third-down and red-zone performance vs. Ohio State

Texas lost a thriller in Dallas. How did they fare in two key areas?

In a game that lived up to its heavyweight billing, the Texas Longhorns lost 28-14 against the Ohio State Buckeyes in a thrilling showdown in the College Football Playoff semifinal at the Cotton Bowl that came down to the final moments. Fueled by a defense that delivered when it mattered most, the Longhorns had opportunities throughout the game to take control, none bigger than first and goal down seven late in the fourth quarter.

For Texas, an inability to score in this moment marked a continuation of red-zone woes in key games dating back to last season. Even with Ohio State entering the game ranked second in the country in red-zone defense and red-zone touchdown rate, the goal-line failure in the fourth quarter will stick with fans in burnt orange for years to come.

In the final rendition of Crunch Time, we’ll analyze how Texas performed in two key area — third downs and in the red zone.

Third downs

5-of-15 (33.3 percent)

Photo by CFP/Getty Images

The Longhorns stayed in the game despite struggling mightily on third downs, converting just 33 percent overall, a figure ballooned thanks to a standout third-quarter drive. In that pivotal drive, Texas converted 4-of-4 third-down attempts, keeping the game alive. Outside of this series, however, the offense faltered, going a combined 1-of-11 third downs, including failing to convert any in the second or fourth quarters (0-of-4 and 0-of-3, respectively).

Somewhat surprisingly given those numbers, the Longhorns generally faced manageable third downs — Texas saw an average distance of 6.6 yards, a figure that would suggest good things if the run game had any traction. Instead, the Horns were unable to rely on running the ball and instead had to throw it as quarterback Quinn Ewers went 40of-10 passing (40.0 percent) on third down.

Ewers was regularly sacked or forced to evacuate the pocket on third down. He was brought down twice, hurried once, scrambled once, and had a handful of check downs as a result of an Ohio State front that quite simply outplayed the Texas offensive line.

One particularly masterful play from Ewers came on 3rd and 10 with 7:51 left in the third quarter and the score 14-7 in favor of Ohio State. With the pocket collapsing, Ewers flipped the ball to running back Quintrevion Wisner, who scampered for a huge first down. Ewers’ knee was just inches off the ground as he shoveled the ball to Wisner.

Wisner shined on third down during this drive, converting two additional opportunities on the ground. His three third-down conversions accounted for all but two of Texas’ third-down successes for the entire game.

No third down would be bigger than the final conversion of that drive. Facing 3rd and 7 at the OSU 26-yard line, running back Jaydon Blue lined up offset to the left of Ewers. With Blue’s speed and cutting ability in mind, Sarkisian turned to a play that had already proven effective earlier in the game and against past opponents.

As a pressure came off the edge unblocked, Blue slipped out on a wheel route with no defender in coverage. Yet it was Ewers’ poise in the pocket under pressure from a free rusher that made the difference as he stood tall and delivered the pass. After securing the catch, Blue made one defender miss and scored to knot things up.

The Texas offense wrapped up the season converting third downs at a 43-percent clip, ranking 41st nationally. That’s a notable improvement from last year’s 38.4-percent conversion rate, which ranked 70th, giving Sarkisian and his staff a roughly 4.5-percent boost and a leap of 30 spots. Not too shabby.

As expected, Texas was far less efficient on third downs in losses compared to wins, converting just 27.7 percent in defeats versus 47.3 percent in victories.

Red zone

Two attempts, one touchdown, one turnover

Photo by Ron Jenkins/Getty Images

The red-zone sequence that ended the game for Texas will go down as one of the most infamous play call series in Longhorn history. For months, people will dissect the decisions by Sarkisian and execution that resulted in the Longhorns being unable to score on eight plays inside the red zone, including 1st and goal from the OSU 2-yard line and 1-yard line.

Before jumping into that series, let’s take a look at the other red-zone opportunity that Texas created. After a half filled with little success, Texas got the ball down 7-0 with a 1:52 left in the second quarter. Behind a fourth-down conversion by backup quarterback Arch Manning and 24-yard catch and run by wide receiver Silas Bolden, the offense had 39 seconds to move the ball 18 more yards and even the score.

After an incomplete pass to wide receiver DeAndre Moore Jr, Sarkisian dialed up a man beater with Blue lining up in the backfield and taking off on a wheel route. With a quick fake inside, Blue created a few steps of separation, which was more than enough space for Ewers to deliver the ball into.

The touchdown temporarily evened the score at seven.

The remaining red-zone chance was the must-have, head-scratching series of plays that resulted in a strip sack by Ohio State defensive end Jack Sawyer.

Let’s start from the beginning of the red zone.

Texas got into the red zone after wide receiver Matthew Golden, who re-entered the game after leaving with an ankle injury, snagged a deep pass for 27 yards down to the OSU 13-yard line, setting up 1st and 10.

Texas ran the ball with Blue for two yards before a check down to Wisner for five yards.

On 3rd and 3 at the OSU 6-yard line, Ewers targeted wide receiver Ryan Wingo in the middle of the field at the back of the end zone, which drew a huge pass interference call.

The chains reset and the ball was placed on the OSU 2-yard line.

Perhaps the best play call of the entire series was an RPO Glance intended for Golden on the left side, a staple play for Texas in a lot of crucial moments for this offense.

Golden drew pass interference, the chains reset and the ball was placed on the OSU 1-yard line.

First and goal. One yard to go.

The rest will haunt Texas fans for eternity.

First down featured a jumbo package with a handoff to freshman running back Jerrick Gibson, who has excelled in short-yardage packages. He was promptly stuffed.

The jumbo package has worked well for Texas in the past. Sarkisian has routinely relied on back-up lineman or even defensive lineman to get an extra push — two years ago, defensive lineman Keondre Coburn and Byron Murphy were featured on the goal line and last year, Murphy and T’Vondre Sweat saw action in the backfield. This year, that package died.

This brings us to the second-down call, a gun toss that was stopped for a huge loss. You’ve seen the play. You’ve seen All-American safety Caleb Downs shoot the gap off the back side of left tackle Kelvin Banks and take Wisner down.

I don’t agree with this call, but the reasoning behind moving away from the interior run game is understandable, likely rooted in the pre-game plan, only made worse given Ohio State’s defensive line dominance throughout the game, as exemplified by the first-down stop of Gibson. Given this, I’d go so far as to say that criticizing Sarkisian for moving away from an interior approach seems shortsighted, even thoughtless.

The play calling in this unique context is further complicated by the limited in-game data Sarkisian had on short-yardage scenarios. Texas only faced one 3rd and 1 and one fourth down prior to this, making this their first goal-to-go opportunity against the Buckeyes. While some might argue that this should have prompted Sarkisian to use his best goal-line plays, it’s equally likely that he instead leaned more heavily on the predetermined advantages that the staff identified during game prep. Those pre-game insights, coupled with the results of the first-down run, heavily influenced the second-down decision.

If we revisit previous play calls to understand these perceived advantages, one notable decision stands out — Sarkisian opting for Manning to run a sweep on 4th and 1. This choice strongly suggests that the staff lacked confidence in Texas’ ability to generate an interior push in short-yardage situations.

Even with a bigger, stronger, and more mobile quarterback, Sarkisian chose to attack the edge. While this strategy is certainly debatable, the fourth-down call clearly reflects a pre-identified opportunity that the staff believed could exploit Ohio State’s defense. Whether this was the right angle is up for discussion, but the toss call undeniably aligns with their game plan in short-yardage scenarios.

All of this is to say that calling an outside pitch is certainly puzzling, especially given the result, but it’s not without a logical foundation. Does that mean I agree with the toss? Absolutely not. I’d much have preferred isolating Golden, freeing Helm, or moving Ewers from the pass rush, but I can understand why the staff opted for a completely different approach than the interior run game in this situation.

Plus, I’m old enough to remember two iconic examples of questionable goal-line decisions in the Super Bowl — each with very different outcomes. The Seahawks famously threw the ball against the Patriots and lost, while the Patriots themselves called a second-down toss from the 2-yard line to win against the Falcons. Perhaps it’s just the Patriots’ magic, but these moments highlight a universal truth — when a bold decision works, the coach is hailed as a genius; when it fails, they’re seen as a misguided and unprepared decision-maker. Success or failure often shapes the narrative far more than the logic behind the call.

The toss call, for all discussions since and all discussions that will occur, didn’t put the nail in the coffin. Texas still had the ball at the OSU 8-yard line down seven points with two timeouts remaining and the two-minute warning to stop the clock. The Longhorns very much could have scored or even been stopped and had enough time to get the ball back. Obviously, neither happened, but the opportunities didn’t die on second down.

On third down, Ewers looked to Wingo in the end zone. Wingo struggled to get separation on the corner route that included a lot of contact. With Sawyer coming up the middle, Ewers faced pressure despite just Ohio State rushing three. Dropping eight and still forcing a hurried throw demonstrates why Ohio State became the second-best red-zone team in the country. Golden and tight end Gunnar Helm were both blanketed, so Ewers got the ball out of his hand and delivered a throw that was more prayer than anything else to Wingo. It fell incomplete.

A corner route in the boundary against single coverage is a must-win in this scenario. The contact was questionable, but the opportunity doesn’t get much better. Shedding physical corners, especially once they have their hands on him will be a key piece for the budding superstar this offseason — Wingo’s speed and explosiveness are elite. If he can further polish his route running, the potential for Wingo, especially as a red-zone weapon, is endless.

The final play of the red zone for Texas was the strip sack touchdown. An unintentionally featured subject of this piece, Sawyer once against whipped a Texas lineman and not only sacked Ewers, but took the ball back for a touchdown to hammer the final nail into the coffin.

On the strip sack, Ohio State rushed four, once again opting to play coverage in the back, and yet it resulted in pressure on Ewers. Helm appeared to be the primary target on the left, but was double-covered, leaving Wingo and Wisner as next options. Neither were really open for a throw and Sawyer easily chased down Ewers to create the turnover.

This sequence will leave any Texas fan in disarray for the foreseeable future. It should. But the entire red-zone body of work is not washed away, nor should it be judged solely on this moment.

The touchdown rate for Texas was dramatically improved, moving from last year’s rate of 50.8 percent and rank of 120th to a closing finish at 63.8 percent and a rank of 54th. The Longhorns scored touchdowns on 13 percent more red-zone drives and jumped 66 spots in the rankings. This is the best touchdown rate since 2021, even with more attempts and games than the previous two seasons.

Let’s hope Texas can convert when it matters next season. Hook ‘em.