Crunch Time: Analyzing Texas’ third-down and red-zone performance vs. Arkansas

The Longhorns battled in Fayetteville for a win. How did key performance areas affect the victory?

No love was lost between the No. 3 Texas Longhorns and the Arkansas Razorbacks this past Saturday in Fayetteville as the Longhorns secured a 20-10 victory in a slow battle that quickly turned competitive in the late third quarter. After leading for most of the game, but failing to distance themselves from the Razorbacks, the Longhorns found themselves in a three-point dog fight with around 12 minutes left. Texas ripped off two huge offensive drives and forced a fumble to secure the win.

For Texas, the defense once again looked the part of an elite unit and carried the Longhorns to victory. Offensively, Texas struggled to find a rhythm for most of the game and suffered from a lack of possessions, especially in the second half which saw quarterback Quinn Ewers and company only touching the ball four times.

In this week’s rendition of Crunch Time, we’ll analyze how the Texas offense performed in two key areas — on third downs and in the red zone.

Third downs

4-of-15 (26.7 percent)

Photo by Wesley Hitt/Getty Images

Texas was unable to convert third downs consistently against Arkansas with a conversion rate of 26.7 percent, the second worst of the season behind a 13.3-percent rate in the loss to Georgia.

The Longhorns started cold on third down, going the entire first quarter without a conversion. What’s worse is that every single play went for negative yardage — two sacks and a failed jet sweep summated to 16 yards lost, but more importantly three punts.

In a hostile road environment, sustaining offensive drives early in the game is crucial. Not only does it instill confidence for the duration of the game, but it can eliminate the crowd’s impact.

On both sacks, the necessity of Ewers to navigate the pocket was clear. On the first play, Ewers correctly tried to climb the pocket while keeping his eyes downfield, but was tackled as he advanced forward. With just four rushers, Arkansas was able to get home, a failure of the offensive line especially considering that running back Quintrevion Wisner chipped on his way out of the backfield.

After dropping into coverage and recording a sack, Arkansas switched up their defensive look, bringing both backers and a corner on a blitz. Texas had enough blockers to pick up the blitz with running back Jaydon Blue staying in pass protection, but Ewers tripped.

With a lone safety over top and man coverage across the board, the Razorbacks elected to gamble on this particular third down. Texas failed to make them pay.

The remaining third down of the first quarter was a failed jet sweep to wide receiver DeAndre Moore Jr. with wide receiver Isaiah Bond and tight end Gunnar Helm serving as the two most important blockers. On the sweep, the defender Bond was responsible for pursued the fake handoff before quickly redirecting to Moore. At that point, he had moved away from Bond horizontally and vertically — too far inside and up the field for Bond to reach.

While watching this play, it’s easy to want to put criticism on Bond for his failed block and the lack of effort. While both these are true, they are not the entire story. Without a doubt, Bond could have exerted more effort to block the Arkansas defender that stopped the play.

However, the block that Bond had to make is not coached to sprint off the line and directly engage with the defender. In this scenario, it appeared Bond was waiting to engage the defender at Bond’s pre-snap alignment with a responsibility for sealing the edge and walling off the defender. He had to ensure the defender could not horizontally pursue the sweep and stop the ball carrier on the outside. If Bond attacked the defender with a poor angle or too aggressively, the defender would run right by him. Bond had to maintain outside leverage, hence how he came off the ball.

Given that Sarkisian opted to fake a handoff, it is also likely that Texas hoped the misdirection would couple with the speed of Moore to take the defender out of the play without Bond having to do anything. Regardless, the intricacies of this block do not take Bond completely off the hook. If he saw that the previous attempts to slow down the defender did not work, he had to find a way to slow down the defender. Some way. Some how. So, while part of his effort and technique are explained by the type of block required on this type of play from his alignment, more is required from him.

The other failed block came from Helm, essentially the lead blocker from this tight end position responsible for kicking out a defender to open the far side of the running lane. Helm initially got his hands on the Arkansas defender and blocked him such that the running lane was created. Thanks to Bond’s defender, Moore had to redirect, which allowed Helm’s defender to come back into the play and clean it up. Had Moore been able to cut the ball up field, Helm’s block would likely have been enough to secure the first down.

Had Helm completely blocked the defender out of the play or put him on his back, it is possible that Moore could have eluded one defender for a positive gain. Two defenders were too much and threw off the timing off the play, allowing the rest of the defense to arrive in pursuit.

Together, these blocks played poorly off each other and created an eight-yard loss.

The formula for Texas scoring didn’t include an improvement on third down. Instead, the Longhorns avoided third downs altogether. On both touchdown drives, Texas did not face a single third down. For better context, Texas drove 61 yards on six plays over 2:17 and 75 yards on eight plays over 3:36 without facing a third down. This demonstrates how lethal this offense can be — 14 plays and 136 yards is remarkable.

The most important third-down conversion for the Longhorns came from most unlikely circumstances. Like most football teams, Texas struggles in third and distance. With the score 20-10 and roughly five minutes left in the game, the Longhorns faced 3rd and 13 from their own 35-yard line. A stop on this play could give the Razorbacks, who still possessed three timeouts, enough time to score on two possessions.

Sarkisian opted for a screen to Blue that went go for 17 yards and extended the drive. Ewers and Blue both demonstrated their ability to navigate traffic. With defensive linemen in his face, Ewers backpedaled while keeping his throwing window free, pulling the linemen without getting sacked. Blue meanwhile danced between the moving linemen from both teams to get his spot and catch the ball on the move from Ewers.

The two most important blocks on the play came from wide receiver Silas Bolden and right guard DJ Campbell. Both players put key defenders out of the play. Blue was given a lane because of Bolden and Campbell and neither block was easy.

For Bolden, he was responsible for a stalk block. While he got his hands on the defender about eight yards down the field, the defender was able to elude the block. Bolden didn’t give up, staying with the block and getting enough of the defender to slow him down when Blue came running past.

Campbell’s effort on this play was noteworthy as well. For linemen, screens represent a different skill set than traditional blocking techniques — they must navigate the open field and block defenders at full speed. The timing required for screens is just another wrinkle. Campbell proved to overcome each of these challenges.

From his guard position, Campbell was able to reach the only other defender besides Bolden’s that had a chance at stopping the play, redirecting the linebacker just as Blue cut upfield. With that defender taken care of, Campbell kept looking for work, a great attribute for a lineman. By the end of the play, Campbell had travelled from his stance on the left hash all the way beyond the right hash mark 10 yards down the field.

I would be remiss if I didn’t mention the work of center Jake Majors and left guard Hayden Conner on this play. While Bolden and Campbell took care of primary defenders, Majors and Conner went after people down the field. The running lane for Blue stayed cleared thanks to their effort down the field as well.

Texas continued this drive for the remainder of the game, running the clock out and securing the win on the road in what is becoming a staple of head coach Steve Sarkisian’s wins in hostile environments.

For the year, Texas has converted 43.4 percent of third downs, an increase from last year’s rate of 38.4 percent. The Longhorn offense currently ranks 34th in the country and eighth in the SEC in conversion percentage on third downs.

Red zone

Three attempts, two TDs, one made FG

Photo by Wesley Hitt/Getty Images

Texas was able to score on all three red-zone trips. Totaling 17 points, the Longhorns leaned on the magic of three and two, with two touchdown passes from No. 3 to No. 2 and a 33-yard field goal by Bert Auburn.

The first score for Texas, a 20-yard connection between Golden and Ewers, flaunted the offensive prowess of Sarkisian. With a secondary that was triggering on screens early, Sarkisian dialed up the fake screen wheel. Just like last week against Florida, Golden found himself wide open and Ewers delivered to put the Longhorns on the board.

If Texas continues to rely heavily on screen passes, the fake screen wheel route will continue to be a deadly counterpunch against overly aggressive defenses. This has now worked for Texas in back-to-back weeks.

This play design punishes defensive backs and safeties for overcommitting to the screen game, something they must do to stop a staple of the Texas offense. With this play on film in back-to-back weeks, upcoming defensive coordinators will think twice before triggering on screens, which could be enough to elevate the screen for Texas to another level.

The second touchdown catch for Golden was a play from two future NFL players. Texas fans should be grateful for the talent this roster has. Not many collegiate programs can connect on this type of throw, much less multiple times in the same season.

Ewers delivered a perfect pass while on the run to a spot that only Golden could reach. Golden showed his ability to get open and his sure handedness, securing the catch with outstretched arms while a defender was draped on his back.

Perhaps the biggest takeaway from this play is the trust that Sarkisian has in both players to land this play. Golden was the only viable option on the play. The only other route was a back-side in by tight end Juan Davis. With Ewers rolling right, that route is not in play. It was Golden or bust. And like so many times before, Golden delivered.

While Davis essentially ran a decoy route on the touchdown, he did have a huge catch to secure first down in the red zone just two plays prior.

Facing 2nd and 8 at the 12-yard line, Ewers scanned right before coming back to Davis on the left for a check down. Davis ran a four-yard out. After seeing Ewers work back toward him, Davis instinctively came back to the ball and flashed his numbers, giving Ewers a bigger target. Davis secured the catch with full momentum and broke a tackle to secure an eight-yard gain and enough yardage to move the chains.

The Golden catch doesn’t happen without the Davis first down. For Davis, this was a rare moment in the spotlight — it was just his seventh catch of the year, the senior from Fort Worth is primarily used as an additional blocker. In a one-possession game late in the fourth quarter, Davis didn’t flinch.

The lone red-zone drive that didn’t end with a touchdown secured three points. Three points is better than no points, but Texas had opportunities to find paydirt.

To start, Texas had very favorable field position, starting the drive at the Texas 49-yard line and momentum. In just three plays, the Longhorns moved to the Arkansas 13-yard line.

After a promising first down carry, Texas suffered a one-yard loss when Blue was bottled up trying to bounce the play outside. On 3rd and 7, Arkansas gifted Texas man coverage by bringing a Cover 0 blitz. This freed Helm to run a short slant in one-on-one coverage, but Ewers led Helm too far out front and the ball fell incomplete.

Texas has to complete this pass — the line picked up a six-man blitz, the coverage was soft, and even if Helm doesn’t get the first down, a completion gives you the choice to go for it on 4th and short.

The play design on this third down is discerning — a short, quick throw with a high completion probability that sets Texas and its players up for success. However, my issue with this play reflects a broader concern about getting the ball to key players in key moments.

This offense is stacked with dynamic weapons, and while Helm is certainly capable of running the route effectively, targeting Golden or Bond as the first read would be more optimal. Both players bring a different level of explosiveness with the ball in their hands, particularly in the red zone.

That being said, this specific play’s outcome wouldn’t have changed no matter who ran the slant, as the throw was uncatchable for any Texas receiver. Still, it’s worth noting that at this stage of the game, Bond and Golden had just four touches combined, while wide receiver Wingo had yet to record one and would ultimately go without a single touch the whole game. If Texas anticipated man coverage with this personnel group (given the substitution between second and third down) in this part of the field, leaning on Golden or Bond as primary options makes more sense. Not because Helm can’t execute the play, but because of the added upside they bring.

Both were on the field during this specific play. Golden ran a slot fade on Helm’s side that had no shot thanks to a seven-yard cushion, while Bond ran a slow-developing double move that appears was never going to be targeted. Prioritizing these players in similar situations moving forward could elevate the offense from great to unstoppable.

Sarkisian later recognized the need to target one of these players, Golden, on the aforementioned touchdown catch where he was essentially the only route runner.

For the season, Texas has scored 33 touchdowns on 46 red-zone attempts in addition to six red-zone field goals makes for an overall scoring rate of 84.7 percent, which is tied for 69th in the country. At 71.7 percent, however, the touchdown rate for the Longhorns is up from an appalling 50.8 percent last year, and ranks 22nd nationally.